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Status Signaling and the Law,
with Particular Application to Sexual Harassment
Gertrud M. Fremling and Richard A. Posner*
Laws aimed at sexual harassment, nudity, and pornography are
usually understood to be concerned primarily although not
exclusively with “offensive” behavior rather than with more palpable
or measurable harms. The precise nature of the offensiveness,
however, is unclear. We shall argue that it is connected to status
through the concept of signaling. Differences in the optimal sexual
strategies of men and women translate into differences in actual or
perceived status that in turn incite behaviors that create a demand for
public or private regulation. Although our particular interest is status
signaling, we discuss the phenomenon of status more broadly and
explore a number of applications. In particular, we offer a fresh
perspective on a social policy of growing importance—the provision
of legal remedies against employers for sexual harassment in the
workplace.
We first discuss what status is, why people have a vested interest
in defending their status, and why a status interest might deserve
some legal protection. Then we try to explain why, in the sexual
area, it is primarily women rather than men whose status is at risk,
and then we talk about the laws regulating sexual harassment,
nudity, and pornography. Although we argue that concern with,
even striving for, status is not a product of mere vanity, we also
question the justifications that might be offered for some of the legal
protections of status, especially the economic justification for laws
*
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punishing sexual harassment. We develop our points with the aid of
both economics and evolutionary biology. Both perspectives are
often overlooked in discussions of the legal regulation of sex-related
behaviors.1
I. The Concept of Status and Why It Is
Determined Differently for Men and Women
A. The Economics of Status
“Status” has been a concern primarily of sociologists, anthropologists, and historians rather than of economists; and though
there is a growing economic literature,2 status is still widely
considered a noneconomic phenomenon, because it cannot be purchased or traded. Status is bestowed rather than bought. A person’s
status is a function of beliefs that others hold about him (or her),
and one cannot pay someone to believe something, because belief is
involuntary. Although one can invest in activities that will raise one’s
status, for example by publicly donating to charity, or indeed just by
flaunting one’s wealth, one cannot buy status directly, as one can the
usual good or service.
But modern economics, returning to its roots in Aristotle,
Smith, and Bentham, does not limit its purview to explicit markets.
And status is much like reputation, about which there is a large and
1

As convincingly argued with reference to the biological perspective i n
Kingsley R. Browne, “Sex and Temperament in Modern Society: A Darwinian
View of the Glass Ceiling and the Gender Gap,” 37 Arizona Law Review 971
(1995). On the economic approach to sex, see Richard A. Posner, Sex and
Reason (1992).
2 See, for example, Robert H. Frank, Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior
and the Quest for Status (1985); Frank, “The Demand for Unobservable and
Other Nonpositional Goods,” 75 American Economic Review 101 (1985); Roger
D. Congleton, “Efficient Status Seeking, Externalities, and the Evolution of
Status Games,” 11 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 175 (1989);
Chaim Fershtman and Yoram Weiss, “Social Status, Culture and Economic
Performance,” 103 Economic Journal 946 (1993); Yoram Weiss and Chaim
Fershtman, “Social Status and Economic Performance: A Survey” (University
of Chicago, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the
State, Working Paper No. 139, Aug. 1997).
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growing economic literature. Both are forms of capital that are
acquired indirectly and once acquired enable the possessor to make
(or prevent him from making) advantageous transactions in personal
or commercial markets. They differ in several ways, however. One is
that status is relational, or, as is sometimes said, “positional”; one’s
status is relative to that of someone else. We speak of higher rather
than greater or better status, but of having an excellent rather than a
higher reputation. The emphasis is on good versus bad reputation
rather than on one’s place on a ladder. Granted, the “ladder”
metaphor is a little misleading. Status systems are not closed at the
top. The holder of the record for the fastest mile in the world might
want to break his own record, since someone else might some day do
so and take his place. Our essential point, however, is that a person
can have a good reputation yet be of low status.
Conversely, a person can have no reputation but a high status.
Reputation is dependent on what a person has done or is believed to
have done; status need not be. A new-born prince in a monarchy
will have a high status though no accomplishments, while a slave
will have a low status even if he is highly productive. Status is predictive; the prince is expected to be someone with whom valuable
interactions will be possible (and the slave the opposite), even
though he has no track record (reputation) of such interactions.
Status is thus the more inclusive concept; acquiring a reputation is
one way to obtain status.
In the examples just given, status and power are positively
correlated, but they need not be. Max Weber identified separate
status hierarchies of wealth, power, and prestige. Queen Elizabeth
ranks high in wealth and prestige but low in power. A mother of
septuplets might rank high in prestige but low in wealth and power.
A businessman might rank high in wealth but low in power and
prestige, a government official high in power but low in wealth and
prestige. The existence of distinct status hierarchies underscores the
difference between reputation as a summary of accomplishments and
status as a predictor of opportunities for desirable or undesirable
interactions. A person who is wealthy by birth will have high status
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in the wealth hierarchy; he is someone “worth knowing” even
though he has no record of accomplishments.
Another difference between status and reputation is that the
determination of the former involves even lower information costs
than the determination of the latter. When status is not merely ascribed, as in the case of the new-born prince, it is a kind of shorthand or proxy for reputation, in the same way that reputation itself is
a summary of all that is known about the character and
achievements of a prospective transacting partner. A person who is
reputed to be wealthy, or powerful, or virtuous may acquire by reason
of his reputation a status in the eyes of people who may have no
other knowledge of his reputation. A physicist’s reputation might
lead to his winning a Nobel Prize. This would give him status in the
eyes of people unaware of his reputation. Members of a family may
have no achievements or reputations yet still have status
(acknowledged by deferential or generous behavior by others toward
them) within the family or even the outside world by virtue of such
“accidents” as having reached a great age or having many
grandchildren.
Status is not so closely tied to transactional opportunities as
reputation is. People accord deference to Queen Elizabeth who
never expect to meet her, and sometimes to notorious criminals
whom they’d be afraid to meet. These are examples of “celebrity
status,” a phenomenon that has less to do with the market and more
with the use of symbols to evoke and stand for complex realities; the
stars and stripes evoke and stand for the United States, and Queen
Elizabeth for the glorious history rather than merely the diminished,
almost parodic, present state of the British monarchy. Especially in
the United States, however, wealth achieved through business
success (as well as through inheritance, marriage, or winning a
lottery) may confer celebrity status.
Status should be distinguished not only from reputation but also
from the concept of human dignity, an egalitarian philosophical
concept that is central to Kantian ethics; status is a hierarchical
concept. Kantians believe that people are worthy of being treated
with respect and concern simply by virtue of being human. Even if
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this is true in some sense (although we do not see how it could be
shown to be true, or for that matter false), it would not bear on the
phenomenon of status competition. It is possible to think people
equal in some sense yet recognize that they are unequal in other
senses, including their location on status ladders.
Because status is a capital good, a change in it can produce a
large change in subjective utility, even though in a sense “nothing
has changed.” Greater swings in utility are caused by changes in future prospects than by fluctuations in current consumption of material goods, because a change in those prospects may alter the present
value of one’s entire future consumption. Getting into the “right”
university increases one’s future prospects, and if the present value of
that expected increase is large, and you know it, your current utility
will jump. Status is a kind of ever-shifting index to one’s future
opportunities. This is another reason why the highest-ranking person in a status distribution has an incentive to increase his status
even more.
Based as it is on belief, the value of one’s status capital depends
on the recognition of one’s status by other people. That may be why
a person is offended if others signal a belief that he is of lower status
than he claims, as when a low-status person calls a high-status
person by the latter’s first name, or uses the intimate form of the
second person (du or tu versus Sie or vous), signaling that he thinks
(or thinks others might think) that their status is equal. Since status
is relational, the offense is not negated by the possibility that the
low-status person is trying to signal that he is really a high-status
person rather than that the other person is a low-status person like
himself.
Even a very important person may be deeply offended by being
called by his first name by an unimportant person, unless obviously
uninformed or incompetent—a child, for example. If the difference
in status is both obvious and large, the inference that the mode of
address is a calculated insult rather than a misunderstanding of the
status relation will be inescapable. And the “offense” is magnified by
the value of what is harmed—the lofty status of the very important
person—in the same way that stealing a person’s wallet does more
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harm if it contains $250 than if it contains $5. The offense of
calling a higher-status person by his first name is less when done in
private, since without an audience there is no signal to third parties.
Low-status people sometimes “ape” high-status people, for example by buying cheap knockoffs of expensive goods, such as a
perfume that smells like Chanel No. 5 or a synthetic diamond
indistinguishable from the “real thing.” Although imitation is said to
be the sincerest form of flattery, the benefit of being flattered may be
offset by the increased costs of finding a way to signal status credibly.
The costs are twofold. Some people will doubt the status of the
high-status person, thinking him one of the apes. And to the extent
that aping is successful, it will create the impression that there are
more high-status people than there really are, and this will dilute the
status of the true high-status people.
Trademarks provide some protection against aping.3 This may
or may not be a good thing. Status competition, like competition in
other positional goods, can be socially wasteful. Every expenditure on
raising one’s own status imposes an external cost—the reduction in
other people’s status. If the others respond by expending resources on
increasing their status, the result may be a restoration of the original
status hierachy, and the competitive expenditures will have been
wasted. But the effect of legal protections of status on this
competition is uncertain. On the one hand, it increases the costs of
the competitors, the “apers” as we are calling them. On the other
hand, it increases the incentive to obtain marks of status in the first
place, for example by conspicuous consumption. The net effect is
unclear. And even if it were clear, the welfare implications would be
ambiguous. For it is not the case that status rivalry is always a zerosum game and therefore should be discouraged. In a dynamic society,
such as that of the United States, the desire to enhance one’s status
is generally a spur to socially beneficial rivalry. People in a society that
is open, mobile, and competitive usually cannot attain high status
without achievements, and so status rivalry motivates people to work
3

See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, “Trademark Law: A n
Economic Perspective,” 30 Journal of Law and Economics 265, 308–309 (1987).
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harder than they would otherwise do. Unless they can appropriate
the entire social product of their harder work, they confer external
benefits. Status rivalry may also generate external benefits by
increasing the amount of charitable giving. Very little such giving is
anonymous. This implies that people derive status from being
known to be charitable.4
Although reputation and hence status are instrumental goods,
they are also—status particularly—consumption goods. People derive
satisfactions from having a high status that are distinct from the
competitive advantages that status confers.5 One’s self-esteem is enhanced by knowing that others think highly of one, since the
opinion of others is a more objective measure of value than one’s
personal and inevitably biased self-assessment. Higher-status people
are envied, and they derive pleasure from this because envy is
especially credible evidence of the superior status of the envied person.
The instrumental value of status, and the utility that is derived
from being envied, may explain the phenomenon (made famous by
Thorstein Veblen) of “conspicuous consumption.” The intrinsic
value of status may explain the curious fact that status is valued even
when it is not signaled, as when a wealthy person wears clothes or
jewelry that look ordinary but in fact are extremely expensive. The
contrast between appearance and reality reminds the person of how
4

On the importance of recognition as an incentive for charitable donations,
see Eric A. Posner, “Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifts and
Gratuitous Promises,” 1997 Wisconsin Law Review 567, 574 n. 17; Amihai
Glazer and Kai A. Konrad, “A Signaling Explanation for Charity,” 86
American Economic Review 1019, 1021 (1996); William M. Landes and Richard
A. Posner, “Altruism in Law and Economics,” 68 American Economic Review
Papers and Proceedings (May 1978). The positive welfare effects of status rivalry
are emphasized in Congleton, note 2 above.
5 Elias L. Khalil, in an unpublished paper, “Symbolic Products: Prestige,
Pride and Identity Goods” (Department of Economics, Ohio State University
at Mansfield, 1997), defines “symbolic goods” as goods that increase utility
without satisfying any wants. Status, when enjoyed “for its own sake” rather
than as an instrument for obtaining other goods, is an example of a symbolic
good in Khalil’s sense. For evidence that status indeed increases an individual’s
sense of well-being, see Frank, note 2 above, at 23–38.
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special he is. There is also satisfaction in fooling other people.
Imagine how foolish a person would feel who treated a poorly
dressed individual in a supercilious manner, only to realize later that
he had been condescending to a wealthy person who had been
“slumming.” Making another person look foolish is likely to increase
one’s self-esteem.
It seems impossible to say which external effect of status rivalry,
the negative or the positive, predominates without considering
specific domains and methods of that rivalry. But when such rivalry
is not shown to be, on balance, socially wasteful, government should
not intervene. If the best estimate of the expected benefits of intervention is that they are zero because of uncertainty and the fact
that the benefits of intervention can be negative as well as positive,
the net expected social cost must be negative since intervention
always involves some cost.
B. Status as Gendered
Status competition has traditionally (by which we mean until
the dramatic changes in American gender roles that occurred beginning in the 1960s) taken different forms for men and for women.
Men struggle with each other for position in social hierarchies of
wealth, power, and prestige. The result is that men predominate at
both ends of these hierarchies—they are the richest and the poorest,
the leaders and the prison inmates, the heroes and the outcasts.
Failure to consider both ends of the status ladder creates an
exaggerated impression of male status relative to female. The lowest
status rung is occupied by insane and mentally retarded people,
criminals, and beggars, and in all of these groups men outnumber
women.
Because women’s status was until recently (and is still to some
extent) derivative from that of men—the males in her family before
marriage, the husband, as well, after marriage, and eventually her
sons—status competition among women consisted largely of the
woman’s emphasizing her family’s status and displaying the qualities
that made her a superior daughter, wife, and mother. But derivative
status need not signify low status. Traditional “women’s work” takes
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place within the household and thus is not easily observed and evaluated by outsiders. But since, given positive assortative mating,
husband and wife will tend to have similar levels of capability in their
different spheres of work, the husband’s observable performance will
be a proxy for the wife’s unobservable performance. In more intuitive
terms, since the “best” men tend to get the “best” women as wives,
being married to a good “catch” signals that a woman ranks high on
the women’s status scale. Hence the status of women as a group
need not be lower than that of men merely because women’s status
tends to be derivative from men’s.
Some feminists, mistakenly assuming that the only status
hierarchy is male, disparage household production in order to
encourage women to devote more time and effort to working in the
market so that their status will be higher. Yet older women have
considerable status in poor black communities in the United States
because of the importance of child care by grandmothers, most
mothers in those communities being unmarried.
The limiting factor in the growth of a society’s population,
moreover, is the number of women, not the number of men.
Shielding women from harm may therefore reflect their value as
child bearers rather than being an attempt to “put them down” as
being too weak to defend themselves. At the same time, the higher
is women’s status as childbearers and child-rearers by virtue of a social
goal of increasing the size of its population, the less access women
will have to the male status ladder, because they will be fully occupied
in pregnancy and child-rearing. This produces the paradox that the
more valuable women are in one dimension (the bearing and raising
of children), the less social status they will seem to have if status is
mistakenly assessed solely with reference to the status criteria for
men. A further paradox is that high status may be conjoined with
low welfare. This is true of women in poor societies because of the
risks and burdens of pregnancy, as well as of soldiers in embattled societies.
The growing participation of women in all parts of the labor
force and in politics complicates the determination of female status.
Female lawyers, business executives, and politicians participate in the

Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics

10

same status systems as their male counterparts but in addition
continue to participate in the traditional female status systems, in
which marriageability and husband’s status figure importantly. As a
result, the same woman, for example the current U.S. Secretary of
State, may have a different status depending on which status system
is under consideration. The wife of a President has an exalted status,
dependent largely or even entirely on marriage, that may exceed that
of a female cabinet member. Men are less likely to derive status from
their wives except in the wealth hierarchy.
Weber’s threefold division of status systems is thus too simple, if
only because he was not interested in women’s status. Women can
obtain prestige in competition with men by doing traditional men’s
work, but they can also obtain prestige in the traditional female roles
of wife and mother, and sometimes of daughter and grandmother.
The distinctively female status system, revolving around sex and
marriage, is itself differentiated because of the diversity of goals and
opportunities among women. Postmenopausal women, and younger
women who do not want or cannot have children, may still be
interested in marriage, but not as a method by which a woman
obtains financial and other forms of protection for the children she
anticipates having. Less obviously, this may also be true of a fertile
but wealthy woman, who, not requiring the financial resources of a
man to support her children, may prefer to have sex without
marriage, for pleasure; or to have sex, with or without marriage, with
men whom she believes to have good genes. Conversely, fertile men
may be attracted to wealthy women in order to obtain resources for
the children these men already have (or might in the future have) by
other women. A fertile woman who is neither wealthy nor poor is
likely to pursue the canonical female sexual strategy, which involves
seeking marriage with a man who will be a “good provider” for her
children. Poor women on welfare may be like wealthy women in
having their own resources for child support and so not being
dependent on men, while middle-class women may have good incomes that are dependent however on their participation in the labor
force. That participation is likely to be interrupted, or curtailed, if
they have children, and so they will still depend to a degree on men.
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The poorest women, if unable to attract a marriage partner or find a
well-paying “respectable” job, may turn to prostitution, exchanging
sex for financial resources but without the continuity provided by
marriage.
Independently wealthy women do not necessarily forfeit their
status by promiscuous sexuality. Their status is based on wealth as
well as marriageability, and may enable them to obtain high-status
husbands despite the paternity anxiety that a reputation for
promiscuity will engender. In contrast, prostitutes, demonstrating by
their choice of occupation that they have poor marriage prospects,
are invariably of low status in modern cultures. The status of a
woman who follows the canonical female sexual strategy of
snagging a husband well able to support her is much higher than
that of the prostitute, but is still somewhat precarious, as feminists
emphasize. Her sexual attractiveness and her ability to bear children
will decline with age, and her husband will have the resources to be
able to replace her with a younger woman. The wife of a poor man
and the wife who has market skills—which decline much less rapidly
with age, and indeed up to a point may increase with it—are less
likely to be replaced.
C. The Biological Dimension of Status Competition
Status differentiation, insofar as it is related to sexual competition, appears to have a biological component or origin; this is
suggested though of course not proved by the fact that most other
primate species (and many other animal species a well) display status
hierarchies.6 A woman’s inclusive fitness—the prevalence of her
genes in subsequent generations—usually is maximized by her
obtaining for herself and her offspring the protection of a man who
has the resources to assure so far as possible that her offspring will
prosper and reproduce. If human infants did not require prolonged
and extensive protection in order to survive to reproductive age,
women would maximize their inclusive fitness by mating with the
6

See, for example, Primate Societies (Barbara B. Smuts et al. eds. 1987), especially chapters 31 and 32 by Smuts relating dominance and status hierarchies to
sexual competition.
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most genetically fit men, as signaled by health, size, etc., and the
only significance of a man’s resources would be as proxies for health,
size, intelligence, and other desirable genetic attributes. But because
human infants, at least in the prehistoric times in which we evolved
to approximately our current biological state, required male
protection, it is plausible to expect that women are genetically
predisposed to find men who appear to have ample resources for such
protection particularly attractive.
So men compete to acquire resources and success in that
competition greatly influences rank in the male status hierarchy.
Women compete for the high-status men, and the women who are
successful in this competition will have a high female status. Promiscuous women will tend to lose out in this competition because men’s
inclusive fitness is reduced if they expend resources on protecting
other men’s children, unless the men are close blood relatives. The
risk is not trivial. Paternity tests reveal that even today, a significant
fraction of babies have a father different from the one claimed by the
baby’s mother to be the father.7
Male promiscuity will enhance a man’s inclusive fitness unless
the increased reproduction that it enables is offset by a reduction in
his ability to attract and protect a high-status woman and her
offspring. There is evidence for the “double standard,” in which
promiscuity may actually raise male status but almost always lowers
female status.8 Male promiscuity does not raise all men’s status,
however. It is a risky strategy, not only because it is time-consuming,
increases the risk of contracting a venereal disease, and can provoke
lethal reactions from other men, but also because the promiscuous
male may be spreading his support so thinly over his offspring (or
7

R. Robin Baker and Mark A. Bellis, Human Sperm Competition: Copulation,
Masturbation and Infidelity 199–200 (1995).
8 See, for example, David M. Buss, “The Evolution of Human Intrasexual
Competition,” 54 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 616 (1988); David
M. Buss and David P. Schmitt, “Sexual Strategies Theory: An Evolutionary
Perspective on Human Mating,” 100 Psychological Review 204 (1993); D. BarTal and L. Saxe, “Perceptions of Similarity and Dissimilarly Attractive
Couples and Individuals,” 33 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (1976).
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not supporting them at all—he may not even know who they are)
that the chances the offspring will survive to reproductive age are
greatly reduced. This in turn may make him less attractive to
women, although in modern times the advent of the welfare state
and the rise in women’s job opportunities have reduced women’s
dependence on men for the support of children.
Biologically engendered status competitions are likely to persist
in modern life because preferences “hard-wired” in the brain during
the long era in which human beings evolved to their present
biological state will continue to influence behavior even in social settings in which these preferences are today nonadaptive or even
dysfunctional. These tendencies, including the “double standard,”
will be reinforced by the fact that the principal costs of an unwanted
pregnancy still are borne by the woman. We do not deny the importance of cultural factors in human marital and sexual behavior. But
the influence on the behavior of modern people of biology, both
general evolutionary behavior and the specifics of reproductive behavior (in particular the fact that only women become pregnant),
has been underrated; and cultural and biological factors interact.9
II. Sexual Harassment
A. Its Causes, Incidence, and Character
Sexual harassment in the modern workplace consists overwhelmingly of male harassment of females of reproductive age rather
than male harassment of other men or of older women or female
harassment of males,10 and although these other types of harassment are not unknown, we shall concentrate on the first type.

9

See Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richerson, Culture and the Evolutionary Process
(1985).
10 See David M. Buss, The Evolution of Desire: Strategies of Human Mating 160
(1994); David E. Terpstra and Susan E. Cook, “Complainant Characteristics
and Reported Behaviors and Consequences Associated with Formal Sexual
Harassment Charges,” 38 Personnel Psychology 559, 562 (1985).
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1. Men Harassing Women
Among the more common forms of male sexual harassment of
young female employees are threats by supervisors intended to extract
sexual favors from subordinates, sexual solicitation by coworkers
(including supervisors), and verbal or other displays of sexual hostility
toward or contempt for women (for example, decorating the
workplace with nude pinups). The first form of harassment is easy to
understand. The second and third present puzzles, such as why a
sexual solicitation should be resented and why the characteristic
forms in which male coworkers attempt to express contempt for or
hostility toward female workers should offend the latter. Why
should anyone be bothered by receiving an offer she is free to
refuse—don’t all of us want to have as many choices as possible? And
why should women be offended by pictures of nude women?
Another question is why men should be hostile toward female
coworkers.
We do not discuss sexual harassment that involves forceful
penetration or otherwise approaches rape in severity, menace, or
coerciveness. There is no puzzle, given the optimal female sexual
strategy, as to why such behavior causes extreme distress.11 Our focus
is on forms of harassment that are primarily verbal or pictorial and if
they involve any touching at all involve only pats or squeezes rather
than real violence. The intention usually is to solicit the woman for
sex, but of course not all sexual solicitations count as harassment.
The law tries to distinguish between consensual dating and
courtship behavior and off-color banter, on the one hand, and
seriously offensive solicitation on the other hand. A polite marriage
proposal would ordinarily not count as harassment even if it were
resented by the recipient because it was made by a man of low status.
We shall largely ignore the evidentiary difficulties, which are considerable, of drawing this line between the permitted and the
forbidden. The basic idea is clear enough: circumstances may make a
sexual solicitation so unwelcome to a woman as to poison the
workplace of her. An example is where the woman is married and
11

For evidence that it does, see Buss, note 10 above, at 145–147.
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has given no indication that the marriage is troubled or that she has
a taste for adultery, yet she is nevertheless repeatedly pestered for sex
by one or more of her coworkers.
A rule flatly forbidding dating between coworkers would
minimize offensive solicitation and by doing so, as we are about to
see, would maximize the protection of women’s status. But it would
do so at the cost of destroying an increasingly important part of the
courtship market. With most women now entering the workforce
before marriage, the workplace is an important site for courtship12
and also a cheap one, since people can learn a lot about each other as
a byproduct of their ordinary work without having to go out on a
date. And given the ambiguous implications of status protection for
social welfare, it is far from clear that the law should want to give
status as much legal protection as it would if it forbade all dating
between coworkers.
In the case of solicitation by a supervisor, the obvious explanation for why the “offer” is resented is that it often carries with it an
implied threat to fire or otherwise discriminate against the woman if
she refuses. The resentment may be of the threat rather than of the
solicitation per se. But the solicitation too may be resented, as
signaling a refusal to recognize that the woman is of high rather
than low status. A high-status woman, with good opportunities in
the marriage market (perhaps already married or having a high-status
boyfriend), would generally have little to gain and much to lose from
engaging in casual sex with her supervisor. A woman of low status
would be more willing to consent to such a relationship. The
solicitation is thus resented for much the same reason that a person
might be offended to receive a cash gift from a friend. The making
of such a gift would imply a belief that the person was hard up
financially and therefore was of low status in our society, in which
money is an important determinant of status.13 It does not matter
12

See Carol Hymowitz and Ellen Joan Pollock, “Corporate Affairs: The One
Clear Line in Interoffice Romance Has Become Blurred,” Wall St. Journal,
Feb. 4, 1998, pp. A1, A8.
13 As an aside, we predict that cash gifts are therefore more common in societies in which money is a less important determinant of status than it is in our
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whether a woman who is solicited for casual sex is averse to it. Even
if she is not, she may still be offended by the solicitation, because the
solicitation implies that the solicitor thinks she is of low status.
Nor is it critical whether others become aware of the solicitation. If they do, this may lower the woman’s status in their eyes;
they will know there is some possibility, though maybe a slight one,
that the soliciting male had reason to believe that the woman was
interested in casual sex. Even if the solicitation is private, the
woman’s self-esteem will be damaged, because she will realize that at
least one man doubts whether she is really a high-status woman.
If the soliciting male has great power over the woman, the
solicitation may not imply that he thinks she’s in the market for casual sex. He may simply think that although she does not want to
have sex with him, she will do so to protect her job. Even so, there is
an implication about her attitude toward casual sex—not that she
likes it, but that she does not disvalue it as much as some other
women would; she values her job more than her chastity. A related
point is that since sexual solicitation in the workplace (as outside) often implies a violation of moral norms—the man or woman (or
both) may be married, and the man may be promising the woman a
competitive advantage over equally or better qualified coworkers—the solicitation signals the man’s belief that the woman is not a
highly moral person.
The man’s rank may make a difference, though. Although
sexual solicitation by a high-ranking man may be repulsed and resented (the solicitations by former Senator Robert Packwood being
a well-known example), the higher the man’s rank, the less likely
(other things being equal) the woman is to be offended.14 There is
always a possibility that the solicitation might lead to marriage with
a high-status male or confer other advantages. Even if the possibility
is small, the benefits if it materializes may be great enough to make
society. In addition, cash gifts are presumably more common within families,
since status within a family is not determined primarily by money.
14 For evidence, see Buss, note 10 above, at 160–161; also Patricia A. Frazier,
Caroline C. Cochran, and Andrea M. Olson, “Social Science Research on
Lay Definitions of Sexual Harassment,” 51 Journal of Social Issues 21, 28 (1995).
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the expected benefits to the woman of the solicitation exceed the
costs.
The qualification “other things being equal” is important. The
higher the man’s rank, the greater his coercive power over a female
subordinate; and so harassment by a high-ranking man is likely to be
more severe and protracted than harassment by a low-ranking one.15
Female students, for example, rate harassment by a professor as more
serious than harassment by a student.16
Not all sex is either casual or marital/reproductive. The male
supervisor or coworker might be sincerely “smitten” by the object of
his solicitations and desire a passionately romantic rather than merely
casually sexual relationship. We expect that in these circumstances
the solicitation would be less resented than if it were apparent that
all the man was seeking was casual sex; often it would not be unwelcome at all, and therefore would not constitute harassment.
Moreover, the range of meanings that a sexual solicitation can take
on complicates the interpretation of the woman’s initial rejection of
the solicitation. Refusal may be a tactic,17 akin to the ordeals that
suitors in chivalrous tales must undergo to win the hand of a
beautiful princess, for screening solicitations.18 The man who
accepts a rebuff demonstrates by his acceptance either that his
interest in the woman was not very serious or that he is a timid sort.
If he refuses to take no for an answer, exposing himself to the humilitation of a repeated rebuff, his interest is less likely to be a merely
15
16
17

See id. at 27–29.
Id. at 27.
For evidence, see Charlene L. Muehlenhard and Lisa C. Hollabaugh, “Do
Women Sometimes Say No When They Mean Yes? The Prevalence and
Correlates of Women’s Token Resistance to Sex,” 54 Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology 872 (1988), finding that 39.3 percent of the young women
surveyed had engaged in “token resistance” at least once.
18 An alternative explanation, however, is that the woman wants to signal to
the man her acceptance of the “double standard,” lest she be thought
promiscuous and therefore unsuitable for a marriage partner. For evidence, see
Charlene L. Muelenhard and Marcia L. McCoy, “Double Standard/Double
Bind: The Sexual Double Standard and Women’s Communication about Sex,”
15 Psychology of Women Quarterly 447 (1991).
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casual one. After a while, however, his very insistence may make him
more frightening and bothersome than if his interest were casual;
may, indeed, show that he is unperceptive, obsessive, even crazy,
rather than merely deeply pierced by Cupid’s arrows. Another
possibility is that he likes low-probability gambles—but that might
be a sign of poor judgment or of an excessive love of risk.
Women are injured in another way, besides loss of status, by
sexual solicitation in the workplace. A woman who is subjected to
such solicitation will have difficulty assessing her job performance.
She will not know whether she has been hired, promoted, retained,
etc. because she is a good worker or because a supervisor wants to
have sex with her.19 The resulting lack of information about her
performance and ability will make it more difficult for her to plan
her career intelligently. This is especially true given the different
time profiles of a woman’s sexual and vocational “careers.” Her sexual
attractiveness is likely to diminish earlier than her vocational ability,
so that if she infers the latter from the former she may find herself
sidelined in the workplace long before she planned to retire. And
even if she knows her abilities perfectly, she may not be able to convince other employers and supervisors that she owes her current position to those abilities rather than to sex—and she may, in fact, not
owe it to her abilities.
A woman’s status in the sexual system may actually be inversely
related to her status in the vocational system (for example, youth may
be a plus in the former system but a minus in the latter). If so, a
sexual solicitation may degrade her status in both systems. At work,
people may think she’s interested in casual sex rather than in
working; in the marriage market, she may be thought “cheap.”
Kantians might argue that the obvious source of injury from
sexual harassment is the affront to the human dignity of women
that such harassment implies, and thus is unrelated to their rank in
any status hierarchy. But the argument begs the question of why
19

For evidence, see Arthur I. Satterfield and Charlene L. Muelenhard,
“Shaken Confidence: The Effects of an Authority Figure’s Flirtatiousness on
Women’s and Men’s Self-Rated Creativity,” 21 Psychology of Women’s Quarterly
395 (1997).
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being pestered for sex, as distinct from being pestered for one’s autograph or product endorsement or hand in marriage, should be
thought offensive rather than flattering or why being threatened for
sex should be more or differently offensive from other threats. The
answer is inseparable from the biology of sex. The Kantian approach
is too vague to be helpful in dealing with anything as concrete as the
psychology of sexual harassment or the proper scope of legal protection against it.
Sometimes male coworkers do not seek sex with a female
coworker but rather want to expel her from their workplace. Why
might they want to do this? Fear of competition and resentment at
affirmative action are two reasons. The latter may be conjoined with
fear by men for their own safety; male firefighters, for example, may
be afraid that female firefighters, hired over more qualified males
pursuant to a policy of affirmative action, will endanger them by not
being able to perform essential tasks requiring substantial upper-body
strength. But the most important reason for male hostility to female
coworkers probably is a function, once again, of status. The hostility
is a phenomenon primarily of working-class or lower-middle-class
men in “macho” jobs such as policeman, fireman, soldier, miner, or
metallurgical worker. The occupants of these jobs derive status from
public recognition that these are tough and dangerous jobs—jobs
that only men can do. In other words, these workers are on a status
ladder where traditionally all women were below them, and so their
status is challenged if any women are allowed to hold the same jobs.
When men want to drive women out of the workplace, they
sometimes do so by flaunting symbols of male sexuality, as by using
obscene language, exhibiting their genitalia, and posting
pornographic photographs. They may engage in such behavior not
because it is a particularly effective method of harassment, but
because it is the only method they can get away with that would not
involve committing criminal acts for which they might be punished
severely. Yet such behavior can make the workplace intensely
disagreeable for a woman even when no physical harm to her is
being threatened. Women are “turned off” rather than “turned on”
by men who flaunt male sexuality because such flaunting is not a
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reliable signal of status or resources. Women who did not respond
positively to these misleading signals would tend to do better in the
competition for high-status males than females who responded positively, and so an aversion to such signaling may be hard-wired in the
female brain. Moreover, the average person does not like to be
disliked, and so when sexual flaunting is read as expressing hostility,
the target is likely to become upset.
Yet often men post pornographic pictures, use foul language,
etc. not in order to drive women out of the workplace but merely for
their own enjoyment. We know this because similar conduct is
commonly found in workplaces in which there are no women. In
principle in such cases the utility of the displays to the men should be
balanced against the disutility to the women. This is something the
employer would do automatically under the pressure of competition,
and the result might be segregated workplaces. The law here tilts in
favor of the female employee, since it is not a defense to a charge of
sexual harassment that the employer was seeking merely to minimize
labor costs. As we shall see, however, the tilt may not in the end be a
benefit to women as a group.
The question arises why there should be any disutility to women
if the displays of pornography are not intended to drive women from
the workplace. One possible answer is that a woman subjected to
such displays will feel that her status is diminished vis-à-vis other
women, namely the “pinups” themselves. As we shall note in
discussing the demand for pornography, from a man’s standpoint a
picture of a woman can be a substitute for a woman, so a woman
working in a place festooned with nude pinups for the delectation of
her male coworkers will be forced to compare herself with women
who having been selected for their sex appeal will ordinarily
dominate the woman worker along that dimension of
attractiveness.20 This is not an adequate explanation for women’s
20

For evidence that “centerfold exposure” will cause men to find their spouse
less attractive (but that there is no corresponding effect on women when they
are exposed to a centerfold of a nude man), see Douglas T. Kenrick, Sara E.
Gutierres, and Laurie L. Goldberg, “Influence of Popular Erotica on
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distaste for nude pinups in the workplace, however, since the same
invidious comparison between the pinup and the woman worker is
likely from exposure to fully clothed “media beauties.”21 More important is the implication that the men are indifferent to the feelings of
their female coworkers (an indifference that is itself a challenge to
status), or preoccupied with sex and therefore unlikely to treat female
coworkers in a straightforward comradely manner. The display of
pornography might also imply a belief by the men that their female
coworkers are interested in, or at least not averse to, casual sex, and
for reasons explained earlier such an implication is offensive.
2. Women Harassing Men
We have emphasized male harassment of women because it is
more common than the reverse. It is more common not only
because there are more male than female workers, and in particular
more male than female supervisors, but also because women are more
likely than men to be offended by sexual solicitations.22 The fact
that a woman seeks sex with a man23 does not signal a perception
that he is a low-status male, unless he is in one of the occupations
(such as the clergy, politics, management in “conservative” large
corporations, and, at times, the military and teachers) in which men
lose status by engaging in casual sex. And because men are on
average more indiscriminate in their desire for sexual partners than
women are, a woman’s solicitation of a man for sex is more
“complimentary” than a man’s solicitation of a woman. Indeed most
men are flattered to be solicited for sex other than by a prostitute or
other very low status woman.24 (Solicitation by either may imply

Judgments of Strangers and Mates,” 25 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
159 (1989).
21 Id. at 166.
22 See Buss, note 10 above, at 160.
23 Not an uncommon case. See Helen E. Fisher, Anatomy of Love 32–33
(1992).
24 A good example of the difference in male and female reactions to sexual
solicitations is sexual solicitation of a teacher by a student. The female teacher
is much more likely than the male teacher to be offended, thinking that the
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that the man is thought to be unable to attract a woman of high
status, and such an implication is a challenge to his status.) A telling
bit of evidence is that many men are willing to have casual sex with a
woman they would not date, whereas many women are unwilling to
have casual sex with some men whom they would date or with any
men whom they would not date.25 And since a man’s sexual
attractiveness to women does not decline as much with age and may
be positively correlated with his occupational status, a favorable performance evaluation by a female supervisor motivated by a sexual
interest in the man is not as misleading or as damaging to his occupational prospects.
The status of any minority, moreover, including women in
traditional male jobs, is more sensitive to the misconduct of one
member than the status of the majority is. The minority’s status is
inherently precarious because there is less information about its
performance. In Bayesian terms, there is a less favorable prior belief
in the minority’s ability to perform and therefore a single new
observation is more damaging.26 This implies that a woman in a
traditionally male job would be more sensitive to accusations or assumptions indicating that she was not performing well because of a
romantic involvement with another worker.
student’s solicitation is an impertinent challenge to her status. The male teacher
is quite likely to be flattered.
25 Douglas T. Kenrick et al., “Evolution, Traits, and the Stages of Human
Courtship: Qualifying the Parental Investment Model,” 58 Journal of Personality 1 (1990); R. D. Clark and E. Hatfield, “Gender Differences in Receptivity
to Sexual Offers,” 2 Journal of Psychology and Human Sexuality 39 (1989).
26 Compare the following two cases, in both of which there is evidence which
if considered by itself creates odds of 4 to 1 in the minds of the average observer that a particular worker is underperforming, but in Case A the worker is
a man and in case B a woman. Suppose that prior to confronting the evidence
the observer reckons the odds of a man’s underperforming at only 1 to 10, but
the odds of a woman’s underperforming at 1 to 2. Then after confronting the
evidence, the observer will think the odds that the (male) worker in Case A is
underperforming are only 4 to 10, but the odds that the (female) worker i n
Case B is underperforming is 2 to 1, even though there is strong evidence of
underperformance in both cases. Cf. Frederick Mosteller and David L.
Wallace, Applied Bayesian and Classical Inference: The Case of The Federalist
Papers 54 (2d ed. 1984).
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B. Is Sexual Harassment Inefficient? The Allocative Effects of Sexual
Harassment Law
We have shown why male harassment of females is so much
more common than the reverse, why the same behaviors by men and
women may have different signal content and therefore a different
legal status if the law is concerned with offensive behavior, and why
perceptions of offensiveness may differ systematically between the
sexes. But we have not shown why the law should forbid sexual
harassment. In general a strong economic case for regulation requires the presence of significant externalities. The reason is that in
their absence the market is likely to bring about an optimal
allocation of resources. Since the harassment with which we are
concerned is incidental to a contractual relationship—namely
employment—it might seem that the optimal amount can be
achieved without legal intervention. We pointed out earlier that in
deciding whether to permit nude pinups in the workplace, the
employer would trade off the costs to its female employees (who
would insist on being compensated in higher wages) against the
benefits to its male employees, who would accept lower wages. With
costs and benefits thus internalized by the employer, the optimal
decision should reached.
The analysis becomes more complicated, but the conclusion is
the same, if we consider the negative effects of sexual harassment on
productivity. They are likely to be especially great when supervisory
employees threaten or even just pester female subordinates for sexual
favors. Apart from the time spent in making and fending off
undesired sexual advances, there will be selection (both self-selection
and selection by male supervisors) for hiring, retention, and
promotion of women who are sexually attractive and willing to trade
sex for professional advancement. Unless these characteristics are
highly positively correlated with characteristics valued by the
employer, which is unlikely, the productivity of the employer’s
female workers will decline if sexual harassment in the workplace is
rampant and results in a selection in favor of “promiscuous” women.
But all that this need imply is that the cost of harassment will
be reflected not only in a wage premium—a kind of “combat
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pay”—for threatened female employees, but also in a reduction in the
productivity of the workforce, which is just another cost for the
employer. Women who are not bothered by (who may even desire)
the sexual attentions of male supervisors will not demand a wage
premium, but if their productivity is less at the normal wage the
employer will still be hurt unless he knows who they are and either
fires them or reduces their wages or unless he is able at acceptable
cost to identify and fire or otherwise discipline the harassers.
However, because everyone affected by the harassment—men,
women, and employer—are linked in a contractual relationship and
presumably wish to maximize their utility, it should be possible for an
optimal solution to be reached without regulatory intervention.
Here we take a brief detour to note that consideration of utility
maximization leads us to predict that sexual harassment, like
discrimination generally, will be more common in the government
and nonprofit sectors than in the private for-profit sector of the
economy for the same type of job. The less competitive an enterprise
is, the less incentive it has to maximize its productivity by taking
strict measures against an employment practice, such as sexual
harassment, that reduces productivity. Not that its managers will not
be trying to maximize their utility; but their utility and the
enterprise’s efficiency will tend to diverge more than in the case of a
competitive firm.
The qualification in “for the same type of job” is important. To
the extent that government and nonprofit employment is less likely
to involve “macho” jobs, jobs in which the percentage of female
workers is traditionally and still low, the type of harassment that
involves trying to expel female workers from the workplace will be
less likely than in the profitmaking sector. Not all government jobs
are of this sort, of course; consider fire and police departments. Our
analysis predicts that sexual harassment is more common in such
organizations than in their civilian counterparts. But we shall focus
on employers who are fully subject to the usual market incentives to
minimize cost.
In the case of harassment committed in secret, as when a male
supervisor threatens to fire a subordinate unless she has sex with him,
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or when a male coworker pulls down his trousers in front of a female
coworker when no else is looking, the costs to the employer of detecting the harassment may be prohibitive. In such a case, there
might appear to be an economic rationale for punishing the harasser
similar to the economic rationale for punishing embezzlement.
Because both embezzlement and harassment occur as incidents
to a voluntary employment relationship, it might seem that there
could be no externality in either case and so no economic rationale
for punishment. Embezzlement, however, does involve an
externality, despite its contractual context. If the expected cost of the
limited “punishments” that the employer can meet out to the
embezzler, such as firing him and refusing to give him a good
employment reference, is less than the cost that the embezzlement
inflicts on society, the embezzler will have succeeded in externalizing
some of the cost of his misconduct. To state this another way, were
there no criminal punishment for embezzlement the embezzler
would often be able to externalize the cost of the embezzlement to
his employer because there would be no combination of private
sanctions (such as dismissal resulting in a loss of specific human
capital, or loss of pension rights, or a civil suit for conversion, or a
bad employment reference) that would impose an expected cost on
the embezzler equal to the private benefit to him of embezzling.
This is the economic justification for subjecting the embezzler to
criminal punishment, rather than just to the lesser “punishments”
available to the employer.
Is there a similar justification for laws punishing the employer
when one of his employees harasses another of his employees? The
first thing to note with reference to comparing embezzlement to
workplace sexual harassment is that the law punishes the embezzler
rather than the employer, because the embezzler is the wrongdoer
and the employer is the victim, while punishing the employer rather
than the harasser even though the harasser, like the embezzler, is the
wrongdoer and the employer is a victim along with the person
harassed. This is a puzzling difference. It is true that harassment (at
least when it stops well short of rape, which we have excluded from
our analysis), unlike embezzlement, may not be a serious enough
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wrong to warrant the costs of criminal punishment. Also,
harassment may be too difficult to define with the precision desirable
in criminal statutes. And the private benefit to the harasser will often be small enough for the employer to be able to deter it by the informal punishments that employers are allowed to impose. But the
fact that harassment is not a crime is a strange reason for punishing
one of the victims of it, namely the employer.
The relevant difference between embezzlement and harassment
is not that one is a crime (as well as a tort, the tort of conversion)
and one merely a tort, but that the employer is the only, or at least
the principal, victim of embezzlement, while it is not the only and
usually is not the principal victim of harassment; another employee
is. Like the embezzler, the harasser, while in principle subject to
having to pay tort damages to the person harassed, would often be
unable to pay substantial damages and would therefore not be worth
suing. By making the employer liable for the harm done by the
harassing employee, the law in effect enlists him as a supplementary
law enforcer, thus increasing the probability that harassment will be
deterred or otherwise prevented. Employer liability is thus an alternative method to punishing the detected harasser criminally, or
leaving matters to the self-interest of the employer, of increasing the
expected cost of engaging in harassment. Obviously the prod of
liability is less needful in the case of embezzlement, since the
employer is usually the only victim and we rarely think it necessary or
appropriate to punish victims for not taking steps to prevent themselves from being victimized.27
Employer liability for torts committed by employees that do not
harm just the employer is a method employed widely in tort law.
The doctrine of respondeat superior subjects an employer to liability
for the torts committed by his employees within the scope of the
tortfeasor’s employment. The doctrine has an economic rationale.28
27

But cf. Alon Harel, “Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case
for a Criminal Law Principle of Comparative Fault,” 82 California Law Review
1181 (1994).
28 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 6.8, pp. 204–206 (5th ed.
1998); Alan O. Sykes, “The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic
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If the tort victim is a stranger to the employer’s enterprise (for
example, a pedestrian run over by a truck driven by an employee of
the truck company), rather than another employee,29 and if the
employee who commits the tort is judgment-proof, the cost of the
tort will be externalized unless the employer is made liable. The
significance of the victim’s status of being a stranger to the tortfeasor
and the tortfeasor’s employer is that it makes the cost of transacting
between the potential injurer(s) and the potential victim prohibitive,
and so prevents the enterprise from internalizing all the costs
relevant to the tort. But the employer who is made liable for his
employee’s tort will have an incentive to take all cost-justified
measures in selecting and monitoring his employees, in order to
reduce the likelihood of their committing torts for which he will
have to pay.
A law that makes the employer liable for sexual harassment by
his employees cannot be defended on the ground just sketched
because the imposition of liability for workplace sexual harassment
does not correct an externality. The harasser imposes an externality
to the extent that the expected cost of punishment to him is less
than the social cost of the harassment, just like the embezzler. But it
is an externality to the harasser, not to the employer, because the
employer has a contractual relation with the victim of the harasser,
Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines,” 101
Harvard Law Review 563 (1988).
29 Injuries of one employee by another employee of the same employer are
nowadays in American law mostly governed by workers’ compensation statutes
rather than by tort law. The tort law of workplace injuries contains a doctrine,
the “fellow-servant rule,” that has been carried into the law of sexual
harassment to prevent an employer from being held liable for coworker
harassment unless he knows or should know about the harassment and fails to
take cost-justified measures against it. See, e.g., Baskerville v. Culligan
International Co., 50 F.3d 428, 432 (7th Cir. 1995); Carr v. Allison Gas
Turbine Division, 32 F.3d 1007, 1009 (7th Cir. 1994); Doe v. Lago Vista
Independent School District, 106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir. 1997); Rosa H. v. San
Elizario Independent School District, 106 F.3d 648, 656 (5th Cir. 1997). O n
the economizing properties of the fellow-servant rule, see William M. Landes
and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law 309–310 (19897).
We discuss the structure of the sexual-harassment tort in greater detail later.
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another employee. The Coase Theorem clicks in and implies, at least
as a first approximation (the significance of this qualification will
become clear shortly), that the imposition of liability on the
employer changes only the form in which female workers are
compensated for being harassed. Instead of receiving a wage that
compensates them ex ante for the risk of being harassed, as they
would if employers were not liable for sexual harassment, they receive
a lower wage coupled with a tort entitlement to sue for damages
after the fact if they are harassed. This implies that if women were
free to waive their rights under Title VII30 to sue for sexual
harassment, they would sell those rights to employers for a higher
wage. For if ex post compensation were the most efficient method
of compensating for this workplace disamenity, employers would
adopt it without the prodding of the law. It almost certainly is
inefficient, given the high cost of litigation.
An implicit assumption is that the expected cost of harassment
to female workers is not so great that there is no feasible wage
premium that would compensate them in advance for bearing that
cost. This seems a realistic assumption, since otherwise employers
would be pressing for criminal sanctions for harassment, in just the
same way that they favor criminal sanctions for embezzlers. That
they do not advocate such remedies is some indication that sexual
harassment is not as potentially costly to employers as embezzlement
is and can be dealt with by the market without government
intervention. The emphasis that the law places on employer liability
for sexual harassment may reflect not the economics of the practice
but simply the fact that Title VII, a law enacted in 1964 forbidding
employers to discriminate on (among other grounds) sex, has been
the principal statutory vehicle for making sexual harassment a tort
litigable in federal courts.
Since advance waivers of Title VII rights are forbidden,31 and
since employers are forbidden by the Equal Pay Act32 to pay men
30

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the
principal legal vehicle for litigating claims of sexual harassment.
31 That is, a waiver signed in advance of the harassment. Once the harassment
has occurred, and the employee thus has a legal claim, she can waive it i n
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and women different wages for the same work, analysis of the bearing of the Coase Theorem is more complicated than we have yet
indicated. On the one hand, women are forced to go the ex post
route even if they would prefer a higher wage in exchange for
forgoing a right to sue. On the other hand, part of the employer’s
higher costs are borne by male coworkers. Yet despite these wrinkles,
we have shown that employers do have an incentive that is
independent of law to take measures against sexual harassment, since
the employer who fails to prevent the harassment of his female
employees will have to pay them higher wages.
An unintended effect of making sexual harassment unlawful is
that it makes it more difficult for women individually to signal their
high status; the law thus impedes information. The more common
sexual harassment is, the easier it is for women to establish (or create
the credible pretense) that they are high-status women by rejecting
the sexual advances of male coworkers. The highest-status women
might thus actually be hurt by the legal prohibition of sexual
harassment.
Another effect of the law is to make it more difficult for men to
challenge any woman’s status pretensions. It treats women’s status as
a kind of property right. We generally allow people to challenge each
other’s status pretensions without legal sanction, unlike societies in
which a caste system gives certain groups a legally protected (or denied) social status. It is unclear why this right of challenge should be
suspended in the workplace, when male workers by their behavior
indicate that they do not accept the implied claim of their female
coworkers to be high-status women. This would not justify threats,
physical abuse, or defamation, but might be thought to justify
displays of pornography and other merely irritating behavior,
provided of course that the employer allowed it.
Status would still be legally protected indirectly. Because people
of high status have more to lose from challenges to status that are
exchange for compensation, just as any legal claim can be settled in advance of
(or during) a lawsuit. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
(1974).
32 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).

Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics

30

legally actionable, such as defamation, than people of low status do,
they are entitled to greater damages if they show an infringement of
their rights. But this is no different from the fact that a person of
high income who is disabled in an accident will be able to prove
higher lost-earnings damages than a person of low income disabled
in a similar accident. The law does not recognize a protected status
for the rich, but the administration of the law often produces systematic differences in legal outcomes depending on the wealth of
the parties.
Defamation illustrates the difference between the protection of
status and the prevention of misrepresentations concerning status.
Sneaking into a person’s home and taping his or her sexual activities
there, and then distributing the tape publicly in an effort to portray
the person as immoral or an exhibitionist, would be forbidden by
trespass and privacy law. In addition, if the tape cast the person in a
“false light,” it would be forbidden by the branch of privacy law,
adjacent to defamation law, that provides a remedy when a person’s
character is impugned without outright falsehoods.
The line between defamation involving sex and sexual harassment involving solicitation is not a sharp one, however. If a man
states that a woman is promiscuous, this is defamatory, and if the
claim is false it is actionable. But by soliciting a woman for casual sex,
a man might be implying that the woman is promiscuous, since
otherwise she would not accept his offer and so he presumably
would not make it. The implication will often be quite attenuated,
however. The man may simply be a boor, willing to meet with
continual rebuffs in his quest for casual sex. His behavior will still be
offensive, but it is unlikely to do enough damage to reputation to
justify a suit for defamation. If, however, the woman could prove
that the man’s behavior had damaged her reputation by implying
falsely that she was in the market for casual sex, nothing would
prevent her from bringing a defamation suit. That is different from
entitling her to sue the man’s employer without having to prove that
her reputation was harmed.
A law against sexual harassment has a paradoxical tendency to
alter the character of such harassment in such a way that the public
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may mistakenly believe both that there is more harassment than ever
(because there will be more complaints if there are more remedies,
although an offsetting factor is the deterrent effect of the remedies
on the incidence of conduct giving rise to complaints) and that it
has become grosser since the law was passed. Before there is a law
against harassment, the distribution of men who practice it will be
similar to the distribution of men generally, except that the most
refined, religious, or sexually inert men will not be represented. After
the law goes into effect, the distribution will alter. The law-abiding,
defined as those who are more responsive to legal sanctions, whether
because they have superior “character,” better sexual alternatives, or a
substantial reputation or status capital that will be impaired by the
imposition of such sanctions, will abandon the activity. The men
who continue to engage in it will be a less representative, and more
unsavory, sample of the male distribution.33 Sexual perverts, psychopaths, and other disordered types will now constitute a larger
fraction of the harassers, along with men who are insensitive, coarse,
or stupid.
The general point is that by altering the distribution of actors in
an activity, the law can make the activity seem more menacing and
degraded than it would be if it were not outlawed.34 Through this
selection effect, the making of an activity unlawful may strengthen
the apparent case for making it unlawful. The effect, however, is
likely to be less pronounced in the case of harassment than in the
case of drug dealing. One response to threatened punishment for
harassment is to engage in milder forms of harassment, since they
are less likely to give rise to sanctions.
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C. The Distributive Effects and Political Economy of Sexual
Harassment Laws
As with other antidiscrimination laws,35 a law forbidding sexual
harassment may not on balance benefit the protected group. To
begin with, such a law may make employers more reluctant to hire
women in jobs in which sexual harassment is likely. A possible
offsetting effect, however, is to make employers more reluctant to
hire men.36 Consider a work force that consists of all women, and
now a man applies for a vacancy. The employer might refuse to hire
him, fearing that it would subject the employer for the first time to
potential liability for sexual harassment. But, conversely, the
employer whose work force is all-male will be reluctant for the same
reason to hire a woman. In mixed work forces, the effect of a sexualharassment law on the relative propensity to hire men or women
depends on the propensity of women to complain about real and
imagined harassment and the cost of screening prospective employees for potential female complainers and potential male harassers.
The law gives employers an incentive to segregate their work
force by sex (as by steering women away from jobs in which they
would be traveling with male employees), or more broadly to reduce
women’s workplace courtship opportunities. The law may also place
employers on a razor’s edge where they are liable for sexual harassment if they do not maintain a close surveillance of their workers
and liable for invasion of privacy if they do. The law increases an
employer’s labor costs and so reduces wages, and this may harm
women employees not only directly but also, because women married
to men are harmed when their husbands’ incomes decline, indirectly.
The indirect effect may be more important, since the wage reduction is partially offset by the new form of compensation ordered by
the law: an expected damages judgment for sexual harassment.
35
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If the average woman and the average man are both harmed by
sexual harassment laws, the question arises why we have these laws.
The answer may be that while women as a whole lose, some women
and men gain and they may be more effective politically than the
losers. The clearest gainers are women who are and expect to remain
single and not to have children, since their welfare is not tied up
with that of men. If for practical or legal reasons the employer
cannot discriminate in wages between his male and female
employees, the former will bear a part of any higher labor costs that
are due to women’s rights to complain about workplace sexual
harassment and the result will be a wealth transfer from male to
female workers. Married nonworking women will not benefit from
the transfer, and in fact will lose because their husbands’ net wages
will be lower. This may explain why the sexual-harassment tort is of
recent origin (the 1980s). When most women worked at home, and
those who worked outside generally had low-level jobs, the demand
for protection against sexual harassment was slight. The demand
grew as more and more women entered the workforce.
Another, but related, explanation for sexual harassment laws is
suggested by the economic analysis of the prohibition against
polygamy. Polygamy benefits high-status men and low-status
women at the expense of high-status women and low-status men.37
It does this by enabling high-status men to outcompete low-status
men for women, by providing more demanders for low-status
women, and by forcing high-status women to share high-status
men with other women. (The first two points explain why in
polygamous societies the age of marriage for most men is high and
for most women very low.) Prohibiting polygamy thus benefits
high-status women—as may prohibiting sexual harassment through
the effect of the prohibition in limiting workplace courtship. The
worst enemies of a professional woman interested in marriage are
low-status women in the workplace (secretaries and the like),
because high-status men—the sort of men that high-status women
37
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wish to marry—often marry low-status women. A law that
discourages workplace courtship between employees of different rank
makes such marriages less likely. The law also protects low-status
men with working wives who might be receptive to sexual
solicitations from their high-status superiors, thus completing the
analogy to polygamy, since banning polygamy favors low-status men
at the expense of high-status men.
D. The Structure of Sexual Harassment Law
In the usual case of employment discrimination, the issue of
whether there was discrimination and the issue of the employer’s
liability for the discrimination tend to merge. If the plaintiff can
show that the employer discriminated against him on account of say,
race, he is entitled to a judgment, even though the actual
discriminator will be another employee—the supervisory employee
who fired, demoted, refused to hire, or otherwise harmed the
plaintiff. The doctrine of respondeat superior makes the employer liable for torts committed by his employees within the scope of their
employment, as we have seen. But in the usual case of sexual
harassment, the conduct is not within the scope of the harasser’s
employment. That is, it is not a consequence of the harasser’s trying
to carry out, however ineptly or even maliciously, the job responsibilities that his employer gave him. He is engaged in a “frolic”
of his own for the consequences of which an employer normally
would not be liable unless the employer had been negligent in the
selection, training, or supervision of the employee.
As clarified recently by the Supreme Court, the scope of employer liability in sexual harassment cases is approximately as
follows.38 If the harasser was indeed engaged in a frolic of his own
and thus was not acting within the scope of his employment, the
employer will be liable only if the employer was negligent in the
selection, training, or supervision of the employee—provided that
the harasser was a coworker of the victimized employee rather than a
supervisor. If he was a supervisor, the employer is strictly liable,
38

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998); Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).

35

Status Signaling and the Law

provided the harassment took the form of a company act, a term
we’ll explain shortly. If there was no company act, the employer is
only prima facie strictly liable. He can escape liability by showing,
first, that he had a good internal procedure for responding to
harassment complaints promptly and with appropriate and effective
remedial action, and, second, that the victim failed to utilize the
procedure.
This pattern39 makes a fair amount of economic sense. Although it would be simpler to make the employer strictly liable for
company acts and liable only if negligent in all other cases, the
difference between this and the more complex pattern that the
Supreme Court has imposed has primarily to do with which party to
the suit has the burden of proof on the issue of negligence, and that
is important only in close cases.
Begin with coworker harassment. Strict liability is inappropriate
here from an economic standpoint because the employer could not
stamp out this sort of harassment without going to extreme expense
and greatly curtailing the privacy of its employees, as by putting them
under continuous video surveillance. If the victim of sexual
harassment complains to a supervisor, or a worker who notices
what’s going on complains to a supervisor, or the harassment is so
pervasive (considering its nature, frequency, and number of victims
and perpetrators) that the employer knows or should know about
the harassment, the employer ought to take steps to correct the
problem. He has or should have the information; he has only to act
upon it. And since everyone knows by now that sexual harassment is
of common occurrence in the American workplace, the employer
ought in addition to take, in advance of specific cases of harassment,
preventive measures against it, as by adopting and announcing a
policy against sexual harassment and creating a discreet and
convenient machinery by means of which victims can obtain relief
without exposing themselves to retaliation. These are the
39
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responsibilities that a negligence standard imposes. A standard of
liability that asks the employer to do more than is feasible to control
harassment will impose costs without creating deterrent benefits. If
the employer is liable even when there is no reasonable measure that
he could have taken to prevent the harassment, the only effect will
be to impose extra costs on employers and those with whom they are
linked contractually (including, as we have emphasized, their
employees). Employers will prefer paying the occasional judgment to
incurring costs that, by definition, exceed the employer’s expected
liability costs—by definition, because, were the costs of prevention
less than the expected liability costs, the failure to incur them would
be negligence and so strict liability would make no difference. Strict
liability bites only when there would be no liability under a negligence standard because the precautions that would have prevented
the plaintiff’s injury were not cost-justified.40
Consider now cases in which the harasser is a supervisor rather
than a line employee. We need to distinguish between two types of
supervisor harassment. In the first type (“quid pro quo” harassment),
the supervisor uses or attempts to use his supervisory authority to obtain sexual favors from an employee. In the second type, the supervisor does not use or attempt to use his supervisory authority at all.
He harasses an employee in exactly the same way that an employee
who had no supervisory authority would harass another employee.
From an economic standpoint the proper standard of employer liability here is negligence, just as in the case of harassment by
nonsupervisory employees. It will often be as costly for the employer
to police this kind of harassment by a supervisor as it is to police the
identical harassment by a coworker. The employer may have
thousands of supervisory employees; since they will try to conceal any
harassment in which they engage, the employer may be unable to
detect it without excessively intrusive monitoring. If the employer is
small and has few supervisory employees, failure to detect harassment
40
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is apt to be strong evidence of laxity in the supervision of its
supervisors, and so even there the imposition of strict liability may
add little to the negligence standard.
Regarding the other type of supervisor harassment, quid pro quo
harassment, we again make a twofold distinction. First is the case in
which the supervisor effects a significant alteration in the terms or
conditions of his victim’s employment. He fires her, or denies her a
promotion, or blocks a scheduled raise, or demotes her, or transfers
her to a less desirable job location, or refuses to give her the training
that the company’s rules entitle her to receive. In all these examples
the supervisor is using his delegated authority to do a company act.
Strict liability is appropriate because it is likely to deter this kind of
sexual harassment much more effectively than negligence liability
would, and at a reasonable cost. The employer who is strictly liable
will monitor the exercise of this delegated authority carefully,
knowing that he will be liable if the authority is abused. This
monitoring should be relatively easy to do, since it is usually a mistake
for a firm, quite without regard to any potential legal liability, to give
a supervisor unilateral authority to alter a subordinate’s terms or
conditions of employment significantly. In well-managed companies, decisions having such consequences are subject to rules, and
to review by higher-ups in the company—the industrial equivalent
of appellate review. The rules will be more carefully formulated and
the supervisor’s compliance with them in firing or otherwise hurting
a subordinate more carefully reviewed by the supervisor’s superiors if
the employer is strictly liable for the supervisor’s use of delegated
powers to harass subordinates. Courts applying a negligence standard
would have great difficulty determining how closely the supervisor
should be supervised. Such questions as how many tiers of review
should be provided before an employee can be fired or demoted are
not easily answered in terms of reasonableness or due care, the
criteria of negligence. The regime of strict liability shifts the
responsibility for deciding these questions to the employer, who
knows more than a court does about how to control their supervisory
employees.
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This argument might seem, however, to support strict liability
for all sexual harassment by company employees, including
harassment by coworkers, since employers know more than courts
do about how to extirpate that form of workplace sexual harassment
too. But courts do know, more or less anyway, what is reasonable for
an employer to do about hostile-environment harassment—institute
a tough policy, disseminate it, establish a procedure by which a
worker can complain without fear of retaliation, and respond
promptly and effectively to any report of possible harassment.
Knowing what the employer should do, the courts have only to
decide whether he did it, in order to decide whether he was
negligent and should be liable. When it comes to designing the
optimum system for reining in the discretion of supervisory
employees, however, the courts are at sea and it makes sense to shift
the responsibility entirely to the employer to create and administer
an effective system for the review and control of company actions
taken by supervisors in the exercise of their delegated authority.
Strict liability is inappropriate when the supervisor merely makes
threats, even if the threats are effective. That is why it is important
to distinguish between the type of quid pro quo harassment in
which the supervisor actually alters the terms or conditions of his
victim’s employment (that is, commits a company act) and the type
of harassment in which he merely threatens to do so, whether or
not the victim yields to the threats. Suppose the supervisor threatens
to fire a subordinate unless she’ll have sex with him and she
agrees—or refuses and he does not carry out his threat. In either
case, because he has not used his delegated authority to commit a
company act, a system for vetting such acts would not catch him
out. It will be no more feasible for the company to determine what
is going on in this case than it would be if the harasser were a
coworker who had threatened to steal the victim’s work tools if she
didn’t submit to him.
We conclude that the current structure of the sexual-harassment tort when litigated under Title VII makes at least broad
economic sense by essentially confining strict liability to company
acts. That leaves open, however, the fundamental question, on
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which we have expressed our doubts, that the tort itself makes
economic sense.
III. Nudity and Pornography
Although sexual harassment can involve assaultive or other
tangibly harmful behavior, it is for the most part offensive rather
than concretely injurious. Exposure to the sight of a nude body
(other than in inoffensive settings, such as that of a hospital bed)
and to pornography (whether or not as part of a campaign of sexual
harassment) is similarly a source primarily of offensiveness rather
than of concrete harms or even of disgust and can, like the
offensiveness of sexual harassment, be best understood in terms of
challenges to women’s status. By engaging in conduct that a woman
is expected to dislike because it is inconsistent with the female sexual
strategy, the offender shows that he does not respect the woman. It
is like a person of low status calling a high status person by his first
name.
A. Nudity
Since clothing is usually a more reliable signal of taste, attitudes,
mood, occupation, and wealth than the naked body, it is easy to see
why people in most societies go about clothed even in warm
weather. (And where it is too hot for clothing, people use tatoos,
paint, and mutilation as signaling devices.) Men, for whom the
possession of resources is a more important signal and physical beauty
a less important signal of status than in the case of women, tend to
be more fully, and also less carefully, clad than women.41 A related
reason is that men are less likely to be offended by a degree of female
nudity than the reverse.
Because sexual intercourse requires a degree of nudity, once the
adults in a society go about clothed, nudity becomes a signal of sexual
availability. This is a reason why most women more averse than men
to being seen naked (except when status differences are so great as to
41
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cancel the signal, as when great ladies in pre-Revolutionary France
bathed in the view of their male servants42), and can also help explain why, in modern societies, in which women are not
sequestered, women dress more carefully than men, why they usually
spend more on clothes than men, and why there generally is more
variety in women’s clothing than in men’s. The signal that women
emit by how they dress is more complex than the signal that men
emit. The woman wants to be attractive, and her attractiveness may
be enhanced by scanty or tight-fitting clothing. But she does not
want to flaunt her attractiveness lest she be thought inviting casual
sex. We are speaking, however, of the average woman; some
women, especially while working, want to avoid at any cost being
thought open to sexual solicitation.
None of this explains why there is a nudity taboo—only why
public nudity is rare. It is easy to see why societies that want to
reduce nonmarital sexual contacts, such as Islamic societies, insist
that women be fully clad when in public. And to the extent that
superficial physical differences are irrelevant in most settings,
clothing reduces communication “noise” by blocking out irrelevant
sights, and this may confer external benefits.
Irrespective of these considerations, we can expect laws against
public nudity to be supported by most men and women. High-status
men are harmed if low-status men (normally younger) are allowed to
compete with them for women by flaunting a beautiful body. Highstatus women are offended by male nudity because it often signals
the man’s belief that the woman is available for casual sex. And
women of average or below-average beauty may wish to impede
competition from women of above-average beauty by limiting the
ability of those women to advertise their beauty by going naked. For
the most part, only some low-status men, and some low-status
women, would gain from a relaxation of the ban against public
nudity, these being people whose only assets are likely to be their
bodies. Yet it would not follow that membership in a nudist society
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would be negatively related to income, since low-status people would
not gain much from associating with other low-status people.
There is an unraveling problem if there is no taboo against public nudity. Initially, only people with the most beautiful bodies will
go about nude, with the result that those who are clothed will be
assumed to have the mean beauty of the unbeautiful. This will
induce those at the top of that distribution to unclothe, and this
process will go on until only the ugliest person remains clothed. This
may be one reason why there appear to be no halfway nudist
colonies, that is, colonies in which some of the people go about nude
and others are clothed; it is not an equilibrium. It is true that clothed
people are often found on beaches in which nude bathing is
permitted, but since the clothed are strangers, inferences about the
quality of their bodies, drawn by the nude bathers, would not affect
the statuts of the clothed persons in their own communities.
A related reason for why there are no halfway nudist colonies is
that they would attract voyeurs. Similarly, a relaxation of the nudity
taboo would be taken advantage of disproportionately by exhibitionists. This problem of undesirable self-selection may be another reason for the persistence of the taboo, or, stated in the language of
game theory, the impossibility of a separating equilibrium. Still another point, which is as old as the story of the Garden of Eden, is
that nudity can be a signal of absence of sexual interest, since signs of
sexual excitation can’t be concealed in the nude state. This is still
another reason why nudists would be made uncomfortable by the
presence of clothed persons.
Against all this it might be argued that as a result of changing
mores, people can be so scantily dressed in public without risking
arrest that they can flaunt their body without the total nudity that
would violate the laws against public nudity. Even in the sexually
liberated Western countries of today, however, the public display of
male or female genitals or female nipples would (depending on the
context) send a strong sexual signal that would be offensive to many
people. This is suggested by the lack of public agitation for removing
the remaining legal restrictions.
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Like other taboos, the nudity taboo is stronger than one would
infer just from the laws and law-enforcement practices. Restaurants,
shops, employers, clubs, parents, schools, media outlets, and other
private individuals and organizations frequently impose dress codes
that are far more restrictive than what the law requires.
In comparison to the controversies swirling around pornography and sexual harassment, issues of public nudity have been pretty
quiescent. Efforts are made from time to time to ban “topless”
dancing, but they are powered largely by a concern that such
entertainment is a cover for prostitution.
A recent development is the spread of “right to breast feed” laws,
overriding the normal prohibition of the public display of a woman’s
nipple. The primary reason for these laws is, no doubt, the increase
in breastfeeding as a result of increased awareness of its value for
children. But a facilitating factor is that public breastfeeding causes
little offense, because the function of exposing the nipple for breastfeeding deprives the exposure of the element of deliberate sexual
signaling or advertising.
The breastfeeding laws bring out the important point that the
sexual-signal content of nudity is relative to expectations.43 The
more fully clad a woman is expected to be, the less exposure of her
body will convey a potential sexual signal, just as the nonsexual
context of the exposure of the nipple in breastfeeding reduces or
eliminates the sexual signal that such exposure would otherwise
convey. This analysis may explain not only why different degrees of
undress can have the same sexual charge in different cultures, but
also what appears to be the low level of sexual arousal in nudist
colonies. When people are required to be nude, nudity ceases to be
sexual signal.
B. Pornography
Broadly defined, as radical feminists wish to define it,
pornography includes nude pinups in salacious poses or a state of
sexual excitement even if there is no depiction of intercourse. The
43
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objections to pornography go beyond its display in places in which
women work. Yet fantasizing is a universal and normally approved
dimension of human thought; why should it matter if the experience fantasized is sexual rather than, say, the waging of war or
the commission of a crime? The answer may lie in the difference between male and female sexual fantasies, which in turn is rooted in
the difference between male and female sexual strategies that we
have been stressing throughout this paper. “In women’s fantasies,
lust is the servant of limerence [falling in love] and is intimately
bound up with mate choice; in men’s fantasies the goal is the
satisfaction of lust.”44 Women’s pornography tends to be more
verbal than visual; the male preference is the opposite.45 The
difference may reflect the fact that the female qualities that are most
important to the male from the standpoint of reproductive fitness
are visible and therefore best conveyed through photographs, while
the male qualities that are most important to the female include
qualities such as wealth, power, and reliability that are more precisely
and credibly described in words. And yet the law treats pictorial
pornography more harshly than the purely verbal type. Why societies
dominated by men should prohibit only the type of sexual fantasy
materials that appeal to men is a puzzle. While it is true that verbal
pornography is more easily avoidable than pictorial, since reading a
story takes longer than glancing at a picture, and is therefore less
likely to create a negative externality, this hardly seems a complete
explanation.
The feminist movement is divided on the issue of pornography.
Some feminists point out that the production of pornography
involving live models or actresses is sometimes accompanied by
physical abuse and economic exploitation of these women. But this
could well be an artifact of pornography’s lack of a recognized legal
status, in just the same way that the liquor industry was permeated
by gang violence during Prohibition but not before or after. These
44
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feminists also believe that pornography incites men to commit rape
(that is, they see pornography as a complement to rather than a
substitute for intercourse), or at least causes men to have less respect
for women because it depicts them as merely the objects of male
sexual desire and thus as mere means to other people’s ends rather
than as ends in themselves. But pornography generally does not
depict women as merely passive objects of male sexual desire; it
depicts them as liking sex—just like a man—and it may seem odd
that feminists would object to a genre of expression that depicts
women as having a male type of interest in sex. Pornography might
even be thought valuable to women in combating the stereotype of
the coy, passive female; in fact it is opposed by many social conservatives on this ground. The antipornography feminists may believe,
however, that men’s “natural” interest in sex is augmented by
pornography and that under conditions of equality neither men nor
women would have as much interest in sex as men do now.
According to this view, pornography contributes to an exaggerated
male interest in sex, an interest that “keeps women down.” In a
sociobiological perspective as well, women lose more status than men
do from being depicted as promiscuous, as we explained in Part I.
Other feminists think that the harmful effects of pornography
on women are slight or are outweighed by the danger that the
suppression of pornography might encourage hostility to female
sexual pleasure.46 Their position is supported by the fact that a
substantial number of women do enjoy pictorial pornography. The
fact that women place greater emphasis than men on resources and
commitment in a sexual partner does not preclude an interest in the
male body, since bodily characteristics reflect what genes might be
passed on. The figures are especially high for pornographic videos,
with as many as 11 percent of women purchasing an X-rated movie
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during a twelve-month period (compared to 23 percent of men).47
Women are much less likely to buy pornographic magazines. The
difference may be related to status signaling. Women have a greater
incentive to signal faithfulness than men in order to alleviate the
paternity anxiety of a potential marriage partner. Being seen
purchasing pornography from a newsstand would thus compromise
a woman more than similar activity would compromise a man. For
the same reason, women are less likely to attend a pornographic
movie by themselves than men are; if they attend such a move it is
likely to be as the guest of a man, so that the woman might be
thought just to be keeping him company rather than indulging her
own taste for pornography.48 The VCR enables hard-core
pornographic movies to be obtained discreetly by mail from general
video catalogues for viewing in the privacy of the home. Female
reluctance to signal promiscuity is further shown by the fact that in
responding to sex surveys women understate the number of sex
partners that they have had.49
Historically, pornography has been more tolerated when directed to upper-class than to lower-class men; it is more likely in the
former case to be classified as “art.” This could be because the upper
class is better educated and therefore is considered to have better
taste, so that its preferences command greater respect. Or it could be
because the upper class controls the political and legal system and
uses its control to promulgate a double standard—disallowing the
47
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cheaper equivalent to ordinary citizens while allowing themselves the
enjoyment of the more expensive product.
In addition, lower-class people may behave less responsibly in
sexual matters. If pornography arouses adolescent or lower-class
single men who have poor options in the voluntary sexual market,
the consequence may be more rape. This is less likely in the case of
higher-status men stimulated by pornography, because their lawful
sexual opportunities are better.
The fact that pornography is often used to enhance masturbation complicates the analysis. Masturbation is a substitute for sexual
intercourse, of which rape is one form, so by stimulating
masturbation the consumption of pornography could reduce the
“demand” for rape. However, masturbation is not so common
among less educated men as it is among more educated men,50 and
it is among the less educated that one expects more rape anyway,
since education is a proxy for income and high-income men have
better consensual sexual opportunities than low-income men do.51
If no uneducated men masturbated, the only effect of pornography
on their sexual activities would be to increase their nonmasturbatory
sexual activities, including rape. If no educated men raped, then their
substituting (under the influence of pornography) masturbatory for
nonmasturbatory sexual activity would not reduce the incidence of
rape, and so would not offset the effect of pornography in increasing
the amount of rape by uneducated men.
This analysis shows that pornography could increase the incidence of rape. But there is no convincing evidence of this.52 One
reason may be that pornography is consumed relatively more by the

50
51

Id. at 92 (tab. 3.1).
For evidence that income is negatively related to the incidence of rape, See
Isaach Ehrlich, “Participation in Illegitimate Activities: An Economic
Analysis,” in Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment 68, 94 (Gary S.
Becker and William M. Landes eds. 1974).
52 See, for example, Posner, note 1 above, at 366–371; Larry Baron and Murray A. Strauss, Four Theories of Rape in American Society: A State-Level Analysis
(1989).
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well educated.53 The fewer the uneducated men who consume
pornography, the less effect pornography will have on the incidence
of rape. Further complicating the picture, however, is the fact that
pornography increasingly takes the form of videotapes rather than
books or magazines, and education is a less important variable in the
consumption of the former.54
Even if pornography does not increase the incidence of rape, its
consumption by low-status people, especially adolescents, might be
frowned upon as leading to more intercourse with casual partners,
resulting in more unwanted and out-of-wedlock pregnancies and
more sexually transmitted disease. A significant fraction of the social
costs of these social pathologies would, in the case of low-income
people, be borne by middle- and upper-income taxpayers.
Since men are the main consumers of pornography, it is a
puzzle that the liberalization of pornography has coincided with an
increase in the political and economic power for women, and that
traditional societies (for example, Muslim societies), in which
women have little political power, are more restrictive. If
pornography is harmful to women, why is there not more protection
against it when and where women hold power? The answer may lie
in the changing role of women. When the principal role of the
middle-class woman is to bear her husband many children, a woman
who engages in casual sex is stepping out of her prescribed role.
53

U.S. Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, note 48 above, found
that 38 percent of men with some college (20 percent of women) had recent
exposure to pornography, compared to only 9 percent of men (2 percent of
women) with less than a ninth grade education. Laumann et al., note 47 above,
found (in unpublished data that Professor Laumann has kindly furnished us)
that highly educated men are twice as likely to have bought a sexually explicit
book or magazine in the past year than poorly educated men. With women the
ratio is six to one. Both ratios fall, however, though not below one, when
videos rather than books or magazines are in question. Other survey data,
furnished us by the advertising research staff of Penthouse magazine, reveal that
50 percent of the readership of Playboy, 45 percent of the readership of Penthouse, and 76 percent of the readership of Variations had some college. We have
not been able to obtain comparable data for “second tier” pornographic
magazines such as Hustler.
54 See Laumann et al. data summarized in preceding footnote.
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Pornography revels in casual sex, and therefore contradicts the
official image of women and so is offensive. In today’s wealthy,
Westernized societies, in contrast, the woman’s role as a childbearer
is of less importance within marriage, and marriage itself is a less
important source of a woman’s status.
The average income level may have an independent effect on
the demand for restricting pornography. If freedom of expression is a
superior good, we can expect all forms of expression to be tolerated
more in wealthy societies because it is difficult to restrict one form
alone. When pornography was not tolerated, works of literature that
were not sexually arousing but that offended powerful groups in
society were often classified as pornography and outlawed as well.
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